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Abstract: International migration is an important determinant of institutions, not considered so far
in the empirical growth literature.  Using cross-section and panel analysis  for a large sample of
developing countries, we find that openness to emigration (as measured by the general emigration
rate) has a positive effect on home-country institutional development (as measured by standard
democracy indices). The results are robust to a wide range of specifications and estimation methods.
Remarkably, the cross-sectional estimates are fully in line with the implied long-run relationship
from dynamic panel regressions.
Résumé: Les migrations internationales sont un déterminant important des institutions, non encore
considéré dans la littérature empirique sur la croissance. Nous procédons à des analyses en coupe
transversale ainsi qu’en panel pour un large échantillon de pays en développement et montrons que
l’ouverture  à  l’émigration  (mesurée  par  le  taux  général  d’émigration)  a  un  effet  positif  sur  le
développement institutionnel (mesuré par des indicateurs standards de niveau de démocratie). Les
résultats sont  robustes pour un grand nombre de spécifications et de méthodes d’estimation. De
façon remarquable, les estimations cross-sectionnelles sont totalement en phase avec la relation de
long terme qui ressort des régressions en panel dynamique.
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1 Introduction
Recent research has emphasized the importance of institutions for economic growth
(Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2005, Rodrik, 2007) and explored the determi-
nants of institutions. This paper argues that migration is an important determinant
of institutions, not considered so far in the empirical growth literature.
Migration rst a¤ects institutions by providing people with exit options, thereby
reducing their incentives to voice (Hirschman, 1970); for those who stay, the incen-
tives to voice are also reduced by the possibility of receiving remittance income (which
can act as a safety net), further alleviating social, political and economic pressures
to reform. For example, it is commonly argued that emigration to the United States
contributed to delay political change in countries such as Mexico or Haiti.1 On the
other hand, once abroad, migrants can engage in political activities (e.g., lobby the
host-country government to encourage or block nancial aid, or impose economic
sanctions) which a¤ect the institutional evolution of their home country, for good or
bad.2 International migration also creates scal competition across national jurisdic-
tions, possibly limiting the scope for rent-seeking and, as such, contributing to better
institutional and governance outcomes.3
A second channel through which migration a¤ects institutions has to do with the
fact that migration is a selective process. Migrants are not randomly drawn out of
a countrys population but tend to self-select along a variety of dimensions. First,
migrants may be politically self-selected; in the context of developing and transition
1See for example Hansen (1988) on Mexico and Fergusson (2003) on Haiti.
2A well-known example is the very active anti-Castro lobby in the United States which has suc-
ceeded in maintaining a total embargo on economic relations with Cuba (Eckstein, 2009; Haney and
Vanderbush, 1999, 2005; Vanderbush, 2009). A lesser known example is the role of the Croatian
diaspora in the US and the EU, which strongly supported secession from the former Yugoslavia and
the transition to a market-led economy, provided huge nancial support to Tudjmans Croatian De-
mocratic Union (CDU) party and, following the latters victory in the rst post-communist elections
in 1990, saw its e¤orts rewarded by the allocation of 12 out of 120 seats at the national assembly
to diaspora Croats (Djuric, 2003; Ragazzi, 2009). Diasporas may also at times side with a specic
group in a civil war. For instance, Irish Catholics in the United States have historically provided
nancial and other forms of support to the Catholic community in Northern Ireland, encouraging
the most radical factions and therefore making it more di¢ cult to reach a peace agreement (Holland,
1999; Wilson, 1995). Similar analyses have been proposed notably for Lebanon and Sri Lanka.
3The idea of migration as a personal response to political and economic repression has a long
tradition in economics and political science (see Vaubel, 2008). Recent political economy models
of the interaction between emigration, institutions and development include Esptein et al. (1999),
Docquier and Rapoport (2003), Mariani (2007) and Wilson (2011).
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countries they tend to positively self-selected in terms of preferences for democracy
(e.g., Hirschman, 1993). Second, migrants are typically positively self-selected on
education. Given that more educated individuals and the middle class in general
(Easterly, 2001)  tend to have a higher degree of political participation and to
contribute a greater deal to public policy debates, emigration is likely to hurt the
quality of domestic institutions as well as the process through which good policies are
formulated and implemented. On the other hand, migration raises the expected return
to human capital, thus inducing people to invest more (or more people to invest)
in education (e.g., Mountford, 1997, Beine et al., 2001, 2008, Katz and Rapoport,
2005) and to reallocate talent toward productive and internationally transferable skills
(Mariani, 2007); such e¤ects on the skill distribution can mitigate or even reverse any
adverse brain drain impact on political institutions. Third, another characteristic on
which migrants are not randomly self-selected is ethnicity, with an over-representation
of ethnic minorities among emigrants. This tends to recompose the home-country
population towards more homogeneity, again, for good or bad.4
Finally, emigration increases the home countrys exposure to new political val-
ues and practices, be it directly, through contacts with return migrants and relatives
abroad, or indirectly, through the broader scope of diaspora networks. Such networks
have been shown to foster bilateral trade, investment and knowledge ows (see Doc-
quier and Rapoport, 2012, for a review of this literature) and to contribute to the
transfer of fertility norms (Fargues, 2007, Beine, Docquier and Schi¤, 2013, Bertoli
and Marchetta, 2013) and to the di¤usion of preferences for democracy.
In particular, two recent micro studies nd supportive evidence of a democracy-
di¤usion e¤ect of emigration. In the context of Cape Verde,5 Batista and Vicente
(2011) took advantage of a survey on perceived corruption in public services to set up
a "voting experiment": respondents to the survey were asked to mail a pre-stamped
4In the penultimate paragraph of their article on "articial states", Alesina, Easterly and Ma-
tuszeski (2011) write: "probably the single most important issue that we have not addressed is that
of migrations. One consequence of articial borders is that people may want to move, if they can. ...
In some cases, migrations that respond to articial borders may be partly responsible for economic
costs, wars, dislocation of people, refugee crises and a host of undesirable circumstances. ... But
sometimes the movement of people may correct for the articial nature of borders."
5Cape Verde is a nine-island tropical country o¤ the coast of West Africa with a population of
half a million, good institutional scores by African standards, and a long tradition of migration.
Current migrants represent one-fth of the population, and brain drain rates are extremely high 
67% in Docquier and Marfouk (2006) and remain very high (60%) even after excluding people who
emigrated before age 18 and acquired their tertiary education abroad (Beine et al., 2007).
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postcard if they wanted the results of the survey to be made publicly available in
the national media. Controlling for individual, household and locality characteristics,
Batista and Vicente (2011) regressed participation in the voting experiment which
they interpret as demand for accountability on migration prevalence at the locality
level. They show that current as well as return migrants signicantly increase partic-
ipation rates, and more so for the latter. Interestingly, they nd that only migrants
to the US seem to make an impact, while migrants to Portugal, the other main des-
tination, do not. The other context we report on is that of Moldova, a former Soviet
Republic with virtually no emigration before 1990 which has seen a recent surge in
migration outows, estimated at half-a-million for a population of 3.6 million in 2008.
The evidence we present for Moldova comes from the analysis of election outcomes in
Omar Mahmoud et al. (2013). They take advantage of the quasi-experimental con-
text in which the episode of massive emigration they analyze took place and of the
fact that Moldovan emigration was directed both to the more democratic European
Union and to less democratic Russia, allowing for estimating destination-specic ef-
fects. They nd that past emigration to the West translates into signicantly lower
share of votes for the communist party at the community level and provide suggestive
evidence of information and cultural transmission channels.
The closest related paper is Spilimbergo (2009), who also adopts a cross-country
approach and shows that foreign-trained individuals promote democracy at home if
foreign education was acquired in democratic countries. While he does not identify
the mechanisms at work, he suggests a number of possible channels (e.g., access to
foreign media, acquisition of norms and values while abroad that di¤use at home
upon return, willingness to preserve the quality of ones network abroad, etc.) that
can be generalized to other migration experiences as well. Our paper is similar in
spirit and execution, with important conceptual di¤erences. First, we estimate the
e¤ect of emigration on home-country institutions for all migrants, not just foreign
students, meaning that we proceed to a larger scale exercise. Second, Spilimbergos
data contains information on the number of people with foreign training living either
abroad or in the home country, making it impossible to know whether the e¤ect is due
to those staying abroad or to those who returned. In contrast, our emigration vari-
able consists of the lagged accumulated stock of individuals (aged 25+) born in the
home country and living abroad, suggesting that the e¤ect of emigration on democ-
racy needs not be driven by return migration. Third, identication in Spilimbergos
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paper fully relies on heterogeneous (or destination-specic) e¤ects. Given that our
data set is restricted to OECD destinations which are very homogenous in terms of
democratic performance,6 we cannot test for the e¤ect of emigration to democratic v.
non-democratic countries. Our identication strategy relies instead on instrumental
variables techniques, as detailed in the methodology section below. Fourth, Spilim-
bergo nds consistent results only for the democratic norm at destination" variable,
a weighted average of democratic scores at destination which captures whether emi-
gration is directed toward more or less democratic countries. In all his specications
but one, the interaction term between the number of students abroad and the "de-
mocratic norm" is not signicant. In contrast, our main results are for the volume of
migration, suggesting that whether a country has one or twenty percent emigration
rate makes a di¤erence, not just whether its emigration is directed toward destina-
tions with higher or lower democracy scores. Incidentally but quite importantly, this
also allows us to interpret the magnitude of the estimated e¤ects.
As in Spilimbergo (2009), our methods allow, and indeed force us to examine
the overall impact of emigration on home-country institutions. This is composed
of the direct and indirect e¤ects detailed in the rst paragraphs of this introduction.
Section 2 presents the empirical model, discusses the main challenges for the empirical
analysis, and describes the data. Section 3 presents the results. Section 4 concludes.
2 Empirical strategy
Our goal is to empirically investigate the e¤ect of emigration on the quality of institu-
tions in the sending country. We will use several indicators of institutional quality, It,
and measures of openness to emigration, mt, available for origin country i = 1; :::; N
and year t = 1; :::; T . In our benchmark regressions, the emigration rate is computed
as the sum of emigrants from country i to OECD destination countries j at time
t,
P
jMij;t, divided by the native population of country i, Ni;t. In this section we
present our empirical model, discuss a number of econometric issues and describe the
data sources used for the empirical analysis.
6For example, only one country (Chile) in our sample of 20 OECD destinations was classied as
a "awed" (as opposed to "true") democracy according to The Economist Intelligence Unit in 2008.
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2.1 Model
Our empirical model features the quality of institutions as the dependent variable. It
is well known that institutional indicators exhibit some inertia. We need a dynamic
regression model to explain their evolution. We augment the dynamic specication
used in previous studies (Acemoglu et al., 2005, Bobba and Coviello, 2007, Castello-
Climent, 2008, and Spilimbergo 2009) by adding the emigration rate as RHS variable:
Ii;t = 0 + 0Ii;t 1 + 1mi;t 1 + 2hi;t 1 + 3Xi;t 1 + "i;t (1)
where 0 is a constant, hi;t is the stock of human capital (measured as the proportion
of workers with college education), and Xi;t 1 and is a vector of time-varying explana-
tory variables. The lagged dependent variable enters the set of explanatory variables
with coe¢ cient 0 to account for persistence in institutional quality. All explanatory
variables are lagged by one period (one period represents ve years). Our coe¢ cient
of interest is 1; it captures the e¤ect of the emigration rate on institutional quality
at home. The coe¢ cient 2 captures the e¤ect of human capital on democracy; and
3 is a vector of parameters associated with a set of additional controls such as GDP
per capita, trade openness and ODA ows as share of GDP. Coe¢ cient k captures
the short-run e¤ect of explanatory variable k on institutions.
Such a dynamic model has been extensively used to explain the dynamics of
persistent variables such as the stock of human/physical capital or GDP per capita.
If explanatory variables are constant (mi;t = mi;ss; hi;t = hi;ss and Xi;t = Xi;ss 8t,
where subscript ss stands for steady state) and if the coe¢ cient 0 2 [0; 1], then the
level of the dependent variable converges towards a long-run or steady state level
Ii;ss =
0 + 1mi;ss + 2hi;ss + 3Xi;s
1  0
; (2)
which characterizes the long-run relationship between institutions and the RHS vari-
ables. Hence, k=(1  0) captures the long-run e¤ect of explanatory variable k.
Estimating (1) requires panel data while estimating (2) can be done in a cross-
sectional setting with one observation per country.
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2.2 Econometric issues
We will rst estimate (2) and (1) using OLS or pooled OLS regressions. However,
such regressions raise a number of econometric issues (notably: reverse causality, en-
dogeneity of other regressors, and omitted variables) that might generate inconsistent
OLS estimates. These issues and the way we deal with them are discussed below.
More generally, cross sectional and panel data techniques have their pros and cons.
In a cross-country framework, the underlying steady-state assumptions, albeit ques-
tionable, allows to circumvent the di¢ culty inherent to the endogeneity of the lagged
dependent; however, in such a framework the omitted variable issue is severe. In a
panel framework, on the other hand, we can better deal with unobserved heterogene-
ity and characterize the transitional dynamics of institutional quality; however we
need to nd exogenous instruments that are both country- and time-specic.
Reverse causality. A key issue when using cross-sectional or pooled OLS
regressions in our context is the endogeneity of our main variable of interest, the em-
igration rate. The quality of institutions is likely to a¤ect the desire to emigrate (as
most people prefer to live in countries with good institutions) and the possibility to
emigrate (as bad institutions or low government e¤ectiveness can be responsible for
large administrative costs).7 This means that a positive or negative correlation be-
tween emigration and institutional quality can be driven by reverse causality. Solving
this endogeneity issue requires (i) using a two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation
strategy, and (ii) nding a suitable instrument for migration in the rst stage.
The philosophy of our 2SLS strategy is the following. In the cross-sectional set-
ting, we focus on the year 2005 and follow Frankel and Romer (1999) to construct a
geography-based prediction of bilateral migration stocks, cMij;05. The predicted em-
igration rate, bmi;05, is then obtained by aggregating bilateral migration stocks over
destinations,
P
j
cMij;05, and dividing the sum by the native population size in 2005.
We use the geography-based predicted rate to instrument mi;05 in our rst stage re-
gression. This method is now standard in the migration literature (e.g., Beine et al.
2013, Ortega and Peri 2013, Alesina, Harnoss and Rapoport, 2013) and follows a long
tradition of predicting trade openness out of bilateral trade ows. Following Rodrik
et al. (2004), however, we also include "absolute geography" in our regressions.
In the cross-section settting, the geography-based predictions of bilateral migra-
7Fitzgerald et al. (2013) study the political pull factors of international migration in a gravity
framework.
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tion stocks are obtained from the following pseudo-gravity model:
lnMij;05 = a0 + aj + b1Linij + b2Guestij + b3 lnDij + b4 lnPi;05 + ij;05
where Linij is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a language is spoken by at least 9%
of the population in both countries, Guestij is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a
guest-worker program after 1945 and before the 1980s was observed, lnDij is the
log of the weighted distance that is equal to the distance between i and j based
on bilateral distances between the biggest cities of the two countries (with those
inter-city distances being weighted by the share of the city in the total population
of the country, see Head and Mayer (2002)), lnPi;05 represents the (log) of the total
population at origin in 2005, and aj is a destination-country xed e¤ect. Our model
does not include origin-country xed e¤ects because the latter are likely to capture
the e¤ect of institutions on emigration decisions.
The presence of a large number of zeroes in bilateral migration stocks gives rise to
econometric concerns about possible inconsistent OLS estimates. The most appropri-
ate method to estimate the above model is the Poisson regression by pseudo-maximum
likelihood (PPML). We will use the PPML command in Stata which uses the method
of Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2011) to identify and drop regressors that may cause the
non-existence of the (pseudo-) maximum likelihood estimates. Standard errors are
robust and clustered by country pairs. The limitation of this instrumentation strat-
egy is that most of our determinants of bilateral migration stocks are time-invariant.
In a panel setting, therefore, we follow Feyrer (2009) and use time xed e¤ects and
interaction between geographic distance and time dummies.
Omitted variables. Estimating (2) and (1) requires dening a set of explanatory
variables a¤ecting the quality of institutions. Many explanatory variables have been
used in the literature on the determinants of institutions such as GDP per capita,
human capital, legal origin dummies, religious variables, latitude, fractionalization
indices, etc. A key issue when adding explanatory variables is that they exhibit
collinearity (see Alesina et al., 2003).8 For example, GDP per capita and human
capital are collinear, and latitude is correlated with legal origin and fractionalization.
Introducing correlated controls can therefore generate identication problems among
8For example, Alesina et al. (2003) point out that their index of ethnic fractionalization is
highly correlated with latitude and with the log of gdp per capita (which, in addition, is very likely
endogenous). Moreover, legal origin dummies are highly correlated with religious variables, etc.
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the correlated variables. In a panel setting, we can solve this problem by control-
ling for time xed e¤ects, t, and country xed e¤ects, i. Although they cannot
capture determinants that are both country- and time-specic, they account for may
unobservable characteristics that jointly a¤ect emigration and institutions.
In our estimation strategy, we do not consider a within transformation to con-
trol for unobserved heterogeneity as results will become far too imprecise for several
reasons. First, we know that in a dynamic panel data model, the standard xed
e¤ect estimator is biased and inconsistent in panels with a short time dimension (the
so called Nickell bias (Nickell, 1981)). Second, as Hauk and Wacziarg (2009) point
out, the within estimator tends to exacerbate the measurement error bias and to
understate the impact of explanatory variables in dynamic panel data models with
regressors that are both time persistent and measured with errors. This point is
particularly crucial if the right hand side variables are highly time persistent, as is
the case here. Under xed e¤ect estimation, therefore, eliminating heterogeneity bias
may come at the cost of exacerbating measurement error bias.9 To partly deal with
this problem we use both pooled 2SLS regressions accounting for some time xed
explanatory variables and we consider a SYS-GMM estimator that, under particu-
lar assumptions, controls for unobserved heterogeneity and partly corrects for the
deciencies of the FE estimator.10
Endogeneity of other regressors. Although the 2SLS strategy described above
addresses the endogeneity of emigration rates, it does not account for the endogeneity
of other regressors. For example, the existing literature has studied the impact of
human capital and development on institutions, however it is obvious that institutions
a¤ect economic performance and the incentives to acquire human capital. In addition,
using the lagged dependent in (1) also induces potential biases in the estimation.
To confront the endogeneity issue in a more general way, we will rely on the system-
GMM (SYS-GMM) estimator and compare its results with those of the 2SLS method.
9For example, this can explain why in the growth literature human capital variables have often
been found insignicantly di¤erent from zero in panel xed-e¤ects applications and with negative
signs (see Islam, 1995). Hauk and Wacziarg (2009) show that Monte Carlo simulations are in line
with these results found in the literature. In addition, even if the model is dynamic they also show
that the rst-di¤erence GMM estimator does not perform better in terms of bias properties. For
example, the Monte Carlo simulations regarding the e¤ect of human capital accumulation on growth
display very close results to the xed e¤ect estimates, suggesting that the weak instrumentation
problem may be prevalent in this case.
10See also Blundell and Bond (1998), and Bond et al. (2001) that suggest system GMM to be the
most appropriate estimator in dynamic panel data model when time series are very persistent.
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The SYS-GMM framework accounts for unobservable heterogeneity, endogeneity and
persistence of some of the regressors. It allows us to estimate our model with internal
instruments only, or with a combination of external and internal instruments. In
addition, a sensitivity analysis will also be conducted to check the robustness of the
results to the inclusion/exclusion of certain countries (e.g., socialist countries, Sub-
Saharan African countries, and oil-exporting countries) whose characteristics may
exacerbate reverse causality problems.
2.3 Data
Our data set is a ve-year unbalanced panel spanning the period between 1985 and
2010, where the start of the date refers to the dependent variable (i.e., t = 1985,
t 1 = 1980). In our sample, we are considering only developing countries (according
to the World Bank Classication), and they enter the panel if they are independent at
time t  1. The country sample is selected on the basis of the availability of the data
described in subsection. Table A3 in Appendix A presents the list of countries in our
sample (corresponding to the largest number of observations in panel specications).
Democracy. Data on democracy are taken from the Freedom House data set,
from the POLITY IV data set, and from the Economic Freedom of the World Project.
The Freedom House published the poliitical rights (PR) and civil liberties (CL)
indices. They are based on perception measures gathered through expert coding
based on news reports, NGOs and think tanks evaluations, and surveys administered
to large number of professionals. For the PR index, the questions are grouped into
three sub-categories: electoral processes; political pluralism and participation; and
functioning of the government. The CL questions are grouped into four subcategories:
freedom of expression and belief; association and organization rights; rule of law and
personal autonomy; and individual rights. The sum of each countrys sub-category
scores translates to a rating from 1 to 7, with a higher score indicating more freedom.
Following Acemoglu et al. (2008) we transform these indices so that they lie between
0 and 1, with 1 corresponding to the most-democratic set of institutions.
Another measure of democracy from the POLITY IV data set is also considered.
Indicators of democracy measure the general openness of political institutions and
combines several aspects such as: the presence of institutions and procedures through
which citizens can express e¤ective preferences about alternative policies and leaders;
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the existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive
power; and the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts
of political participation. In our data set we consider a composite index (Polity2), that
ranges from -10 to + 10. This index is also normalized from 0 to 1. Note that while the
"political rights" and "civil liberties" indices are based on public perception measures
and can therefore be seen as a reection of contemporaneous de facto institutional
quality, the Polity 2 indicator is based on expert coding of legal documents and can
therefore be interpreted more as a de jure measure.11
Finally, we also consider Economic Freedom of the World (EFW), an index which
measures the degree to which countriespolicies and institutions support economic
freedom. Five broad areas are distinguished: (1) size of government; (2) legal structure
and security of property rights; (3) access to sound money; (4) freedom to trade
internationally; and (5) regulation of credit, labor and business. This index is also
normalized between 0 and 1. The ratings are determined by combining real indicators
(such as "size of governement", taken from IMF) with answers to survey questions on
other modules (such as "independence of the judicial system" taken from perception
reports e.g., the Global Competitiveness Report form the World Economic Forum,
or "regulatory restrictions" taken from theWorld Banks "Doing Business" database).
Table A1 presents the correlation table between the various institutional indi-
cators. The rst three indices (PR, CL, Polity2) exhibit pairwise correlation rates
between 0.8 and 0.9; their correlation rate with EFW is around 0.45.
Migration. For emigration data, we use the estimates provided in Bruecker,
Capuano, and Marfouk (2013). Focusing on 20 OECD destination countries, they
computed emigration stocks and rates of the population aged 25 years and older by
gender and educational attainment in 5-year intervals from 1980 to 2010. Data are
obtained by harmonizing national censuses and population registers statistics from
the receiving countries. On the whole, the 20 destination countries covered represent
more than 90 percent of the OECD total immigration stock.
Other data. Data on human capital are based on Barro and Lee (2013). Data
on GDP per capita, population, trade, and o¢ cial development assistance (ODA) are
taken from the Penn World Tables and from the World Development Indicators. Data
on legal origins are from La Porta et al. (1999), who provide a set of time-invariant
11It goes without saying that there is a good deal of discrepancy between de facto and de jure
indicators. See Hallward-Driemeier and Pritchett (2011) in the case of the "Doing Business" data.
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binary variables characterizing the origin of national law.12 Ethnic fractionalisation
data are taken from Alesina et al. (2003). Latitude and other geograhic and cultural
bilateral data from the CEPII database and from Sachs (2003).
Table A2 presents summary statistics for selected variables, calculated considering
the largest sample that we use across indicators and estimation techniques.
3 Results
The results are organized in ve sub-sections. We rst use cross-sectional data to esti-
mate the long-run relationship between emigration and institutional quality depicted
in (2) using the OLS and 2SLS regressions with external instruments. Second, we
use panel data to estimate the dynamic specication (1) with pooled OLS and 2SLS
regressions. Third, we re-estimate the dynamic model using the SYS-GMM tech-
nique, combining external and internal instruments. Fourth, we conduct a sensitivity
analysis to check the robustness of our results to the exclusion of certain groups of
countries (socialist countries, oil-producing countries and sub-Saharan African coun-
tries). Finally, we estimate the dynamic model using skill-specic emigration rates to
investigate whether the e¤ect of emigration on institutions varies by education level.
In the latter two sub-sections, we only rely on the SYS-GMM estimation method.
In all cases, the analysis is conducted on four institutional indicators: the Freedom
House PR and CL indicators of political rights (PR) and civil liberties (CL), the
Polity 2 index, and the index of Economic Freedom of the World (EFW).
3.1 Cross-sectional analysis
Tables 1.a to 1.d report OLS and 2SLS estimates for the long-run specication (2)
using data for 2005 for all variables. Standard errors are robust and clustered by
country. In OLS regressions (column 1), the estimated coe¢ cient of the emigration
rate is positive and statistically signicant for each indicator with the exception of
the Freedom House Political Rights Index (PR).
In columns 2 to 8, we correct for endogeneity using 2SLS regressions. The emi-
gration rate is instrumented using predicted bilateral stocks generated by a pseudo-
12Five systems are distinguished: French, German, British, Scandinavian and Socialist.
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gravity model, as explained above.13 The baseline regression in column 2 shows that
the e¤ect of emigration is positive and statistically signicant for all indicators. Com-
pared with OLS, the coe¢ cient of the 2SLS regression is larger. We can conclude that
the OLS coe¢ cient su¤ers from a reverse causality bias: emigration rates decrease
when institutions improve. Interestingly, the quality of institutions also appears to
be positively correlated with our measure of human capital (i.e., the proportion of
college graduates in the resident labor force). In columns 3 to 8, we show that our
results are robust to the inclusion of additional standard control variables such as
absolute geographic variables (latitude, a landlocked dummy variable, area (log) is
sq.kms, percentage of malaria area in 1994, percentage of land area in geographical
tropics), regional dummies, ethnic fractionalisation and legal origin dummies, and
other potential determinants of institutional quality such as GDP per capita, trade
(imports + exports as percentage of GDP)14 and foreign aid (ODA as a percentage
of GNI).15 The inclusion of these control variables does not a¤ect the signicance of
the emigration coe¢ cient. The coe¢ cient is globally stable, except when we consider
the polity2 indicator and control for geographical explanatory variables and regional
dummies (colums 4 and 5). We should notice that at least in the case of geographi-
cal controls, the quality of the rst-stage strongly decreases.16 As expected, human
capital loses signicance when GDP is included because of collinearity.
We consider columns 2 and 6 as our preferred specications. They are suggestive
of a positive causal e¤ect of emigration on institutions. Larger e¤ects are found
for political institutions than for economic institutions, with long-run e¤ects ranging
between 1.4 and 1.6 for the PR index, between 1.2 and 1.3 for the CL index, and
between 1.4 and 1.5 for the Polity 2 index. Overall, this means that a 10-percentage
point increase in the emigration rate raises standardized democracy indices by 12
to 15 percentage points, that is, by 25 to 30 percent of their standard deviations as
reported in Table A1. Regarding the EFW index, the long-run e¤ect ranges only
from .3 to .4, implying that a 10 percentage-point increase in emigration raises the
index by 3 to .4 percentage points (that is, by 25 to 30% of its standard deviation).
13Appendix B describes the model and results are presented in Table A4.
14The existing literature has revealed that good institutions are correlated with openness to trade.
15Foreign aid can have a negative impact on political institutions as they can lead to rent-seeking
activities (Djankov et al., 2008).
16The Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values are respectevey 16.38 and 8.96 for 10% or 15%
maximal IV size .
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Table 1. Cross-section results
OLS and 2SLS, year 2005
1.a. Dependent = Freedom House Political Rights index (PR)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Human capital .0147** .0128** .0179*** .0224*** .0146** .0057 .0127** .0100*
(.0064) (.0060) (.0061) (.0059) (.0071) (.0066) (.0061) (.0058)
Total emig. rate .5670 1.640*** 1.395*** 1.985*** .994** 1.487*** 1.592*** 1.568***
(.3513) (.5135) (.4656) (.7163) (.5013) (.5023) (.5151) (.4897)
Ethnic fract. .0800
(.1504)
Log GDP per cap. .0637*
(.0346)
Trade (% of GDP) -.0337
(.0860)
Net ODA (% of GNI) -.2654
(.1975)
constant .4025*** .3584*** .1856* .4798 .2470** -.0965 .3972*** .3887***
(.0488) (.0522) (.1085) (.4034) (.1152) (.2528) (.0843) (.0621)
Legal origin dummies no no yes no no no no no
Geographical controls no no no yes no no no no
Regional dummies no no no no yes no no no
Observations 99 99 97 95 99 97 97 93
KPW F-stat 17.84 20.45 12.25 13.44 16.89 18.22 16.99
Stock-Yogo critical val.
10% maximal IV size 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38
15% maximal IV size 8.96 8.96 8.96 8.96 8.96 8.96 8.96
Notes:  p<0.01;  p<0.05 and  p<0.1. Robust standard errors clustered by country in
parentheses. Col (1) shows OLS results. Col (2) to (8) show 2SLS results; total emig rate is
instrumented using geography-based, predicted emigration rates. KPW: Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald
F statistics to be compared with the Stock-Yogo critical values for weak instrumentation.
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Table 1. Cross-section results (contd)
OLS and 2SLS, year 2005
1.b. Dependent = Freedom House Civil Liberties index (CL)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Human capital .0144*** .0129*** .0162*** .0197*** .0146*** .0063 .0128*** .0105**
(.0048) (.0047) (.0049) (.0048) (.0053) (.0051) (.0046) (.0044)
Total emig. rate .5174*** 1.311*** 1.107*** 1.485*** .9545*** 1.158*** 1.216*** 1.223***
(.1840) (.3683) (.3473) (.5026) (.3654) (.3536) (.3435) (.3370)
Ethnic fract. -.0077
(.1065)
Log GDP per cap. .0593**
(.0271)
Trade (% of GNP) -5.8e-04
(.0589)
Net ODA (% of GNI) -.2557*
(.1373)
constant .4456*** .4130*** .3318*** .5416* .3395*** -.0085 .4259*** .4449***
(.0371) (.0397) (.0808) (.2790) (.0841) (.1950) (.0648) (.0462)
Legal origin dummies no no yes no no no no no
Geographical controls no no no yes no no no no
Regional dummies no no no no yes no no no
Observations 99 99 97 95 99 97 97 93
KPW F-stat 17.84 20.45 12.25 13.44 16.89 18.22 16.99
Stock-Yogo critical val.
10% maximal IV size 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38
15% maximal IV size 8.96 8.96 8.96 8.96 8.96 8.96 8.96
Notes:  p<0.01;  p<0.05 and  p<0.1. Robust standard errors clustered by country in
parentheses. Col (1) shows OLS results. Col (2) to (8) show 2SLS results; total emig rate is
instrumented using geography-based, predicted emigration rates. KPW: Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald
F statistics to be compared with the Stock-Yogo critical values for weak instrumentation.
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Table 1. Cross-section results (contd)
OLS and 2SLS, year 2005
1.c. Dependent = Polity 2 index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Human capital .0147*** .0137*** .0174*** .0204*** .0112** .0122*** .0135*** .0130***
(.0039) (.0040) (.0045) (.0041) (.0045) (.0046) (.0040) (.0050)
Total emig. rate .7920*** 1.496** 1.166** .9870 .7823 1.435** 1.507** 1.389**
(.2369) (.6026) (.5567) (.7368) (.5235) (.6072) (.6106) (.5752)
Ethnic fract. -.1095
(.1402)
Log GDP per cap. .0112
(.0317)
Trade (% of GNP) -.0622
(.0857)
Net ODA (% of GNI) .2173
(.2719)
constant .5456*** .5191*** .4589*** .5853 .4985*** .4522** .5766*** .5101***
(.0426) (.0475) (.1102) (.3625) (.1083) (.2284) (.0742) (.0585)
Legal origin dummies no no yes no no no no no
Geographical controls no no no yes no no no no
Regional dummies no no no no yes no no no
Observations 94 94 93 92 94 92 93 88
KPW F stat 16.95 18.99 5.89 20.46 16.36 19.77 17.00
Stock-Yogo critical val.
10% maximal IV size 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38
15% maximal IV size 8.96 8.96 8.96 8.96 8.96 8.96 8.96
Notes:  p<0.01;  p<0.05 and  p<0.1. Robust standard errors clustered by country in
parentheses. Col (1) shows OLS results. Col (2) to (8) show 2SLS results; total emig rate is
instrumented using geography-based, predicted emigration rates. KPW: Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald
F statistics to be compared with the Stock-Yogo critical values for weak instrumentation.
16
Table 1. Cross-section results (contd)
OLS and 2SLS, year 2005
1.d. Dependent = Economic Freedom of the World index (EFW)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Human capital .0048** .0047** .0060*** .0046*** .0044** .0012 .0044** .0025
(.0020) (.0019) (.0020) (.0017) (.0021) (.0020) (.0019) (.0022)
Total emig. rate .3166*** .4112*** .3478*** .3107** .3823*** .2863*** .3248*** .3670***
(.1023) (.1208) (.1127) (.1206) (.1444) (.0974) (.1003) (.0991)
Ethnic fract. -.0339
(.0415)
Log GDP per c. .0325**
(.0140)
Trade (% of GNP) .0184
(.0268)
Net ODA (% of GNI) -.3347***
(.1079)
constant .5908*** .5865*** .5589*** .7840*** .5771*** .3519*** .5813*** .6202***
(.0169) (.0168) (.0454) (.0738) (.0417) (.1073) (.0223) (.0184)
Legal origin dummies no no yes no no no no no
Geographical controls no no no yes no no no no
Regional dummies no no no no yes no no no
Observations 75 75 75 73 75 74 74 69
KPW F-stat 16.35 17.29 10.79 12.33 15.43 17.76 14.98
Stock-Yogo critical val.
10% maximal IV size 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38
15% maximal IV size 8.96 8.96 8.96 8.96 8.96 8.96 8.96
Notes:  p<0.01;  p<0.05 and  p<0.1. Robust standard errors clustered by country in
parentheses. Col (1) shows OLS results. Col (2) to (8) show 2SLS results; total emig rate is
instrumented using geography-based, predicted emigration rates. KPW: Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald
F statistics to be compared with the Stock-Yogo critical values for weak instrumentation.
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3.2 Panel analysis with 2SLS
Tables 2.a to 2.d report pooled OLS and 2SLS estimates for the dynamic specication
(1). Standard errors are robust and clustered by country. Compared to the cross-
section regressions, we now control for the level of the lagged dependent variable and
use panel data. The pooled OLS regression in column 1 conrms that institutional
indicators are persistent. The coe¢ cient for the lagged dependent usually varies
between .7 and .8. This means that it takes 20 to 25 years (4 to 5 periods of 5 years)
to reach the long-run level of institutional quality when a shock occurs. The coe¢ cient
of human capital remains positive and signicant in most regressions, except when
we control for regional dummies and GDP per capita. We also identify a positive
and signicant correlation between institutional quality and emigration, except for
the Polity 2 index. As in the previous section, the coe¢ cient increases in 2SLS when
emigration is instrumented; this reects the reverse causality problem of our OLS
estimates. Our instrumentation method in pooled OLS builds on Feyrer (2009); it
consists in introducing time-dummies and interactions between time-dummies and
the log of distance in our pseudo-gravity regression (see Table A4 in Appendix B).
The results in columns 2 to 8 show results that are suggestive of a positive causal
e¤ect of emigration on institutions; the e¤ect is robust to the inclusion of control
variables. Again, we consider columns 2 and 6 as our preferred specications. In the
panel setting, the short-run e¤ect varies between .4 and .45 for the Freedom House
index of political rights, .2 and .25 for the Freedom House index of civil liberties,
.3 to .4 for polity 2, and .10 to .12 only for the index of Economic Freedom of the
World. Estimation of the dynamic specication conrms that larger e¤ects are found
for political institutions than for economic institutions. The long-run e¤ects are
obtained by multiplying the short-run coe¢ cient by 4 to 5.17 Remarkably, they are
almost identical to those obtained in the cross-sectional setting; the only di¤erence
is that we lose signicance for the Polity 2 index. It is worth reminding that Polity 2
captures the quality of de jure institutions, whereas the other indicators are mostly
based on perceptions and capture the quality of de facto institutions.
17In the short-run, a 10-percentage point increase in the emigration rate increases the democracy
indices by 4 to 6 percent of their standard deviation.
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Table 2. Dynamic regressions results
OLS and 2SLS
2.a. Dependent = Freedom House Political Rights index (PR)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
PRt 1 .7820*** .7731*** .7673*** .7273*** .7318*** .7494*** .7705*** .7638***
(.0265) (.0259) (.0271) (.0316) (.0334) (.0272) (.0284) (.0309)
Human capitalt 1 .0051** .0051** .0058*** .0076*** .0022 .0035 .0052** .005**
(.0022) (.0021) (.0022) (.0021) (.0026) (.0024) (.0023) (.0024)
Total emig. ratet 1 .1993** .4249*** .4038*** .6831*** .2481* .4097*** .4624*** .4093***
(.0866) (.1343) (.1295) (.1947) (.1324) (.1415) (.1430) (.1312)
Ethnic fract. -.0058
(.0397)
Log GDP pct 1 .0169
(.0117)
Trade (% GDP)t 1 -.0022
(.0020)
Net ODA (% GNIt 1 .3946
(1.062)
constant .0612*** .0545** .0334 .1142 .0550 -.0575 .0721** .0598**
(.0223) (.0225) (.0331) (.1182) (.0343) (.0818) (.0288) (.0272)
Legal origin dummies no no yes no no no no no
Geographical controls no no no yes no no no no
Regional dummies no no no no yes no no no
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 568 568 558 544 568 556 525 488
KPW F-stat 18.06 21.86 15.76 16.49 17.43 17.70 17.72
Stock-Yogo critical val.
10% maximal IV size 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38
15% maximal IV size 8.96 8.96 8.96 8.96 8.96 8.96 8.96
Notes:  p<0.01;  p<0.05 and  p<0.1. Robust standard errors clustered by country in
parentheses. Col (1) shows OLS results. Col (2) to (8) show 2SLS results; total emig rate is
instrumented using geography-based, predicted emigration rates. KPW: Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald
F statistics to be compared with the Stock-Yogo critical values for weak instrumentation.
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Table 2. Dynamic regressions results (contd)
OLS and 2SLS
2.b. Dependent = Freedom House Civil Liberties index (CL)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
CLt 1 .8052*** .7945*** .7935*** .7474*** .7703*** .7606*** .7991*** .7882***
(.0252) (.0254) (.0248) (.0307) (.0281) (.0280) (.0285) (.0303)
Human capitalt 1 .0048*** .0049*** .0046*** .0062*** .0027 .0027 .0043** .0034*
(.0016) (.0016) (.0016) (.0016) (.0018) (.0017) (.0017) (.0019)
Total emig. ratet 1 .1002* .2499** .2534** .3963*** .1720 .2383** .2162** .2490***
(.0572) (.1005) (.0996) (.1483) (.1055) (.1001) (.0977) (.0928)
Ethnic fract. -.0188
(.0268)
Log GDP pct 1 .0211**
(.0093)
Trade (% GDP)t 1 9.4e-04
(.0015)
Net ODA (% GNIt 1 .2611
(.7365)
constant .0543*** .0524*** .0604** .1780** .0547** -.0854 .0495** .0613***
(.0157) (.0159) (.024) (.0825) (.0255) (.0639) (.0212) (.0176)
Legal origin dummies no no yes no no no no no
Geographical controls no no no yes no no no no
Regional dummies no no no no yes no no no
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 568 568 558 544 568 556 525 488
KPW F-stat 18.29 21.48 16.47 16.54 17.62 18.03 17.88
Stock-Yogo critical val.
10% maximal IV size 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38
15% maximal IV size 8.96 8.96 8.96 8.96 8.96 8.96 8.96
Notes:  p<0.01;  p<0.05 and  p<0.1. Robust standard errors clustered by country in
parentheses. Col (1) shows OLS results. Col (2) to (8) show 2SLS results; total emig rate is
instrumented using geography-based, predicted emigration rates. KPW: Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald
F statistics to be compared with the Stock-Yogo critical values for weak instrumentation.
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Table 2. Dynamic regressions results (contd)
OLS and 2SLS
2.c. Dependent = Polity 2 index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Polity2t 1 .7688*** .7617*** .7525*** .7342*** .6932*** .7425*** .7664*** .7729***
(.0318) (.0304) (.0334) (.0371) (.0420) (.0327) (.0312) (.0311)
Human capitalt 1 .0060*** .0060*** .0066*** .0079*** .0017 .0050*** .0056*** .0063***
(.0018) (.0018) (.0020) (.0018) (.0028) (.0019) (.0019) (.0021)
Total emig. ratet 1 .0976 .3037 .2694 .4759 .1553 .2920 .4113* .1749
(.1153) (.2212) (.2103) (.3042) (.2268) (.2326) (.2500) (.1975)
Ethnic fract. -.0344
(.0441)
Log GDP pct 1 .0111
(.0114)
Trade (% GDP)t 1 -.0035
(.0025)
Net ODA (% GNIt 1 1.285
(1.085)
constant .1072*** .1225*** .1236*** .1658 .1575*** .0540 .1461*** .1124***
(.0241) (.0265) (.0433) (.1285) (.0473) (.0769) (.0333) (.0300)
Legal origin dummies no no yes no no no no no
Geographical controls no no no yes no no no no
Regional dummies no no no no yes no no no
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 543 543 539 531 543 531 507 470
KPW F-stat 13.76 15.39 5.925 17.05 12.65 15.97 14.70
Stock-Yogo critical val.
10% maximal IV size 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38
15% maximal IV size 8.96 8.96 8.96 8.96 8.96 8.96 8.96
Notes:  p<0.01;  p<0.05 and  p<0.1. Robust standard errors clustered by country in
parentheses. Col (1) shows OLS results. Col (2) to (8) show 2SLS results; total emig rate is
instrumented using geography-based, predicted emigration rates. KPW: Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald
F statistics to be compared with the Stock-Yogo critical values for weak instrumentation.
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Table 2. Dynamic regressions results (contd)
OLS and 2SLS
2.d. Dependent = Economic Freedom of the World index (EFW)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
EFWt 1 .7491*** .7498*** .7368*** .7232*** .7553*** .7267*** .7385*** .7593***
(.0290) (.0279) (.0264) (.0290) (.0325) (.0283) (.0280) (.0304)
Human capitalt 1 .0020*** .0020*** .0024*** .0020*** .0018*** .0017** .0020*** .0027***
(5.0e-04) (4.9e-04) (6.5e-04) (5.0e-04) (6.9e-04) (6.6e-04) (5.3e-04) (7.6e-04)
Total emig. ratet 1 .1331*** .1275*** .1155*** .1070** .1261** .1086*** .0864* .0904**
(.0315) (.0435) (.0443) (.0485) (.0566) (.0392) (.0464) (.0382)
Ethnic fract. -.0148
(.0110)
Log GDP pct 1 .0027
(.0043)
Trade (% GDP)t 1 .0013
(8.7e-04)
Net ODA (% GNIt 1 .9756**
(.4685)
constant .1526*** .1525*** .1575*** .2280*** .1468*** .1484*** .1526*** .1403***
(.0195) (.0190) (.0231) (.0314) (.0303) (.0282) (.0185) (.0201)
Legal origin dummies no no yes no no no no no
Geographical controls no no no yes no no no no
Regional dummies no no no no yes no no no
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 424 424 424 412 424 418 411 382
KPW F-stat 19.80 22.19 20.58 17.85 19.81 24.42 18.38
Stock-Yogo critical val.
10% maximal IV size 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38 16.38
15% maximal IV size 8.96 8.96 8.96 8.96 8.96 8.96 8.96
Notes:  p<0.01;  p<0.05 and  p<0.1. Robust standard errors clustered by country in
parentheses. Col (1) shows OLS results. Col (2) to (8) show 2SLS results; total emig rate is
instrumented using geography-based, predicted emigration rates. KPW: Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald
F statistics to be compared with the Stock-Yogo critical values for weak instrumentation.
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3.3 Panel analysis with SYS-GMM
Tables 3.a to 3.d report SYS-GMM estimates for the dynamic specication (1). The
advantage of this method is that we can treat all explanatory variables as potentially
endogenous. In Column 1, we consider all explanatory variables of interest as pre-
determined and instrument them using their one-period to third lags. The choice of
three lags ensures that the number of instruments is large enough for e¢ ciency, but
lower than or equal to the number of country groups.18 Column 2 considers the same
specication but adds external instrument (i.e., we use the emigration rate generated
by our pseudo-gravity model as instrument) to the internal ones. Columns 3 to 5
add additional controls as in the previous sub-sections. However we do not control
for time invariant variables (fractionalization legal origin dummies, etc.) as in the
SYS-GMM, we account for unobserved heterogeneity. Standard errors are robust and
clustered by country group.
The coe¢ cient for the lagged dependent is slightly lower than in the 2SLS model;
it varies between .7 and .77. This means that it takes 18 to 23 years (3.5 to 4.5 periods
of 5 years) to reach the long-run level of institutional quality when a shock occurs.
Another di¤erence is that the coe¢ cient of human capital decreases and becomes
insignicant in several specications. Recall that the literature on education and
democracy is inconclusive: while Acemoglu et al. (2008) found that education has
no explanatory power for democracy, Bobba and Coviello (2007) or Castello-Climent
(2008) found a positive and signicant e¤ect. Our results suggest that the e¤ect
might be there but does not prove to be highly robust to specication choices.
Importantly, our SYS-GMM estimates for emigration remains positive and statis-
tically signicant at usual signicance levels, even when the Polity 2 index is used. In
the SYS-GMM setting, the short-run e¤ect varies between .2 and .25 for the Freedom
House index of political rights (PR), .2 and .22 for the Freedom House index of civil
liberties (CL), .25 to .35 for polity 2, and .11 to .15 only for the index of Economic
Freedom of the World (EFW).
18A problem of the GMM estimator is that too many instruments can overt the endogenous
variable. As rule of thumb, the number of instruments should be smaller or equal to the number of
countries (see Roodman, 2009). We follow this rule even if sometimes, given few data observations
and specications with additional controls, in the reported regressions the number of instruments is
slightly greater than the number of country groups.
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Table 3. SYS-GMM dynamic regressions results
3.a. Dependent = Freedom House Political Rights index (PR)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM
PRt 1 .7716*** .7908*** .7697*** .7680*** .7623***
(.0346) (.0350) (.0320) (.0371) (.0424)
Human capitalt 1 .0037* .0030 .0016 .0040* .0049
(.0021) (.0019) (.0029) (.0022) (.0039)
Total emig. ratet 1 .2497** .2846*** .2592** .2982** .2826***
(.1061) (.1032) (.1085) (.1442) (.1063)
Log GDP per cap. t 1 .0088
(.0197)
Trade (% GDP)t 1 -.0053
(.0396)
Net ODA (% GNIt 1 .0478
(.1813)
constant .0865*** .0806*** .0245 .0737* .1046***
(.0249) (.0254) (.1447) (.0384) (.0337)
Country xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes
Year xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes
External Instrument yes yes yes yes
AR(1) test 1.2e-08 5.8e-09 7.6e-09 1.9e-08 2.6e-07
AR(2) test .9656 .9714 .9681 .4625 .5385
Hansen J test (p-v) .1348 .0802 .2320 .2245 .3607
Observations 568 568 556 525 488
N. countries 99 99 97 98 93
N. instr. 57 58 75 75 75
Notes:  p<0.01;  p<0.05 and  p<0.1. Robust standard errors clustered by country in
parentheses. One-step SYS-GMM estimator. AR(1) and AR(2): p-values of Arellano-Bond test for
serial correlations. Hansen J test: p-values for the null hypothesis of instrument validity. Col (1): all
variables are instrumented using their own 1st to 3rd lags. Col (2) to (5) adds external instruments
(geography-based predicted emigration rate). In addition, SYS-GMM uses 1st di¤erences lagged
one period as instruments for the level equations.
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Table 3. SYS-GMM dynamic regressions results (contd)
3.b. Dependent = Freedom House Civil Liberties index (CL)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM
CLt 1 .7487*** .7784*** .7089*** .7470*** .7464***
(.0364) (.0349) (.0366) (.0403) (.0449)
Human capitalt 1 .0036** .0025* -9.7e-04 .0036** .0040
(.0016) (.0014) (.0024) (.0018) (.0027)
Total emig. ratet 1 .1918** .2099** .2167** .2243** .2223***
(.0822) (.0852) (.0906) (.0999) (.0858)
Log GDP per cap.t 1 .0357**
(.0156)
Trade (% GDP)t 1 .0205
(.0313)
Net ODA (% GNIt 1 .0561
(.1121)
constant .0695*** .0607*** -.1827 .0718** .0814***
(.0212) (.0209) (.1146) (.0318) (.0269)
Country xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes
Year xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes
External Instrument no yes yes yes yes
AR(1) test 2.5e-09 1.3e-09 5.3e-09 3.7e-08 1.4e-07
AR(2) test .9685 .9551 .9030 .9296 .7428
Hansen J test (p-v) .0403 .0198 .1381 .1213 .0578
Observations 568 568 556 525 488
N. countries 99 99 97 98 93
N. instr. 57 58 75 75 75
Notes:  p<0.01;  p<0.05 and  p<0.1. Robust standard errors clustered by country in
parentheses. One-step SYS-GMM estimator. AR(1) and AR(2): p-values of Arellano-Bond test for
serial correlations. Hansen J test: p-values for the null hypothesis of instrument validity. Col (1): all
variables are instrumented using their own 1st to 3rd lags. Col (2) to (5) adds external instruments
(geography-based predicted emigration rate). In addition, SYS-GMM uses 1st di¤erences lagged
one period as instruments for the level equations.
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Table 3. SYS-GMM dynamic regressions results (contd)
3.c. Dependent = Polity 2 index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM
Polity2t 1 .7098*** .7222*** .6981*** .7043*** .7346***
(.0463) (.0455) (.0454) (.0402) (.0453)
Human capitalt 1 .0042** .0037* .0025 .0044** .0052
(.0021) (.0021) (.0027) (.0022) (.0038)
Total emig. ratet 1 .2515* .2877** .2853** .3551** .2038*
(.1294) (.1411) (.1434) (.1503) (.1235)
Log GDP per cap.t 1 .0107
(.0175)
Trade (% GDP)t 1 -.0185
(.0405)
Net ODA (% GNIt 1 .1373
(.1656)
constant .1688*** .1614*** .2588*** .1501*** .1408***
(.0329) (.0325) (.0584) (.0458) (.0339)
Country xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes
Year xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes
External Instrument no yes yes yes yes
AR(1) test 2.1e-07 1.9e-07 3.1e-07 9.8e-07 5.4e-06
AR(2) test .7791 .7789 .7816 .5036 .3877
Hansen J test (p-v) .1275 .1264 .2539 .3945 .6053
Observations 543 543 531 507 470
N. countries 96 96 94 94 89
N. instr. 57 58 75 75 75
Notes:  p<0.01;  p<0.05 and  p<0.1. Robust standard errors clustered by country in
parentheses. One-step SYS-GMM estimator. AR(1) and AR(2): p-values of Arellano-Bond test for
serial correlations. Hansen J test: p-values for the null hypothesis of instrument validity. Col (1): all
variables are instrumented using their own 1st to 3rd lags. Col (2) to (5) adds external instruments
(geography-based predicted emigration rate). In addition, SYS-GMM uses 1st di¤erences lagged
one period as instruments for the level equations.
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Table 3. SYS-GMM dynamic regressions results (contd)
3.d. Dependent = Economic Freedom of the World index (EFW)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM
EFWt 1 .6638*** .6632*** .7215*** .6241*** .6719***
(.0565) (.0564) (.0486) (.0608) (.0593)
Human capitalt 1 .0026*** .0026*** .0027** .0028*** .0041***
(9.6e-04) (9.6e-04) (.0012) (.0010) (.0013)
Total emig. ratet 1 .1553*** .1527*** .1380*** .1930*** .1157***
(.0557) (.0431) (.0389) (.0587) (.0399)
Log GDP per cap.t 1 -.0042
(.0092)
Trade (% GDP)t 1 -.0091
(.0159)
Net ODA (% GNIt 1 .0744
(.0813)
constant .2025*** .2030*** .1558*** .1764*** .1446***
(.0335) (.0332) (.0572) (.0300) (.0317)
Country xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes
Year xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes
External Instrument no yes yes yes yes
AR(1) test 1.2e-05 1.2e-05 4.1e-06 1.7e-04 2.3e-04
AR(2) test .0935 .0933 .0839 .1608 .0963
Hansen J test (p-val) .5533 .5910 .3246 .4800 .6490
Observations 424 424 418 411 382
N. countries 75 75 74 75 69
N. instr. 57 58 75 75 75
Notes:  p<0.01;  p<0.05 and  p<0.1. Robust standard errors clustered by country in
parentheses. One-step SYS-GMM estimator. AR(1) and AR(2): p-values of Arellano-Bond test for
serial correlations. Hansen J test: p-values for the null hypothesis of instrument validity. Col (1): all
variables are instrumented using their own 1st to 3rd lags. Col (2) to (5) adds external instruments
(geography-based predicted emigration rate). In addition, SYS-GMM uses 1st di¤erences lagged
one period as instruments for the level equations.
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Estimation of the dynamic specication conrms that larger e¤ects are found for
political institutions than for economic institutions. The long-run e¤ects are obtained
by multiplying the short-run coe¢ cient by 3.5 to 4.5. Again, they are perfectly
in line with those obtained in the cross-sectional and 2SLS settings. The AR(2)
test, which tests the null hypothesis that the error term is not second-order serially
correlated, and the Hansen J-test of overindentifying restrictions, indicate that the
moment conditions are satised and the instruments are mostly valid.
3.4 Robustness by sub-sample
The above results suggest that emigration positively a¤ected institutional quality in
developing countries between 1985 and 2010. To investigate whether our results could
be driven by the inclusion of countries sharing specic characteristics, we re-estimate
the model using three alternative samples of countries and relying on the SYS-GMM
estimation method with internal instruments or a combination of internal and external
instruments. We rst exclude socialist countries in columns 1 and 2, dened on the
basis of the legal origin dummy. The rationale for doing this is that emigration was
legally restricted in these countries prior to the transition while the fall of the Berlin
wall drastically a¤ected the evolution of institutions and of emigration patterns. One
may also be concerned by the fact that the pre- and post-transition trajectories of
human capital have been peculiar in socialist countries (see Acemoglu et al., 2005).
Second, we exclude Sub-Saharan African countries in columns 3 and 4. Sub-Saharan
African countries are on average less stable politically than the other countries in our
sample. Third, we exclude oil-exporting countries in columns 5 and 6. Several studies
have pointed out a negative correlation between oil exports (and of natural-resource
dependence in general) and democracy (see Ross, 2001, or Tsui 2011).
The results are presented in Table 4 for the Freedom House Political Rights Index
(PR). Similar results (available upon request) were obtained for the other indicators.
We use a parsimonious specication with the lagged dependent, human capital and
the emigration rate. In all cases, the e¤ect of emigration remains positive and signi-
cant at the ve percent level. The short-run and long-run e¤ects are almost identical
to those obtained in the full sample. There is no evidence that the results are driven
by heterogeneity between broad groups of countries.
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Table 4. Dynamic regressions results by sub-sample
Dependent = Freedom House Political Rights index (PR)
no socialist countries no SSA countries no Oil exporting countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PRt 1 .7482*** .7523*** .7428*** .7630*** .7356*** .7631***
(.0357) (.0367) (.0488) (.0484) (.0349) (.0360)
Human capitalt 1 .0043 .0040 .0063** .0059** .0050** .0040*
(.0028) (.0028) (.0027) (.0026) (.0023) (.0021)
Total emig. ratet 1 .3012** .3139*** .2825** .3177*** .2246** .2717**
(.1200) (.1181) (.1266) (.1229) (.1143) (.1092)
constant .0877*** .0860*** .1231*** .1156*** .1040*** .0955***
(.0284) (.0283) (.0356) (.0360) (.0273) (.0279)
Country xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year xed e¤ects yes yes yes yes yes yes
External Instrument no yes no yes no yes
AR(1) test 1.7e-07 1.1e-07 1.4e-04 9.4e-05 1.1e-07 5.5e-08
AR(2) test .6908 .6903 .8875 .8828 .9225 .9139
Hansen J test (p-v) .2839 .1782 .4137 .3632 .1538 .0937
Observations 469 469 378 378 510 510
N. countries 79 79 67 67 89 89
N. instr. 57 58 57 58 57 58
Notes:  p<0.01;  p<0.05 and  p<0.1. Robust standard errors clustered by country in
parentheses. One-step SYS-GMM estimator. AR(1) and AR(2): p-values of Arellano-Bond test
for serial correlations. Hansen J test: p-values for the null hypothesis of instrument validity. Col
(1), (3), (5): all variables are instrumented using their own 1st to 3rd lags. Col (2), (4), (6) adds
external instruments (geography-based predicted emigration rate). In addition, SYS-GMM uses 1st
di¤erences lagged one period as instruments for the level equations.
3.5 Testing for skill-specic e¤ects
Finally, we investigate whether the e¤ect of emigration is governed by the education
level of emigrants (and not only their number). Note that in this section we do
not use external instruments (this is to avoid estimating pseudo-gravity models for
each education group) and rely instead on the SYS-GMM estimation method with
internal instruments only. We start from a parsimonious specication including only
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the lagged dependent and the total emigration rate (see Colum 1 of Table 5).19 We
exclude human capital for two reasons: rst the signicance of this variable was
not robust in our benchmark regressions and, second, we want to minimize the risk
of collinearity between the shares of college graduates in the resident and emigrant
populations. To capture potential heterogeneous e¤ects for di¤erent types of migrants
(high v. low-skill), we proceed in three steps.
First, we split the total emigration rate by education level. More precisely, we
compute skill-specic emigration rates by dividing the number of high-skill (college
graduates) and low-skill (with less than college education) emigrants by the total
native population (we use the same denominator as in our computation of the total
emigration rate). Given that on average, one third of all emigrants have college
education, the "high-skill" and "low-skill" emigration rates are respectively equal to
one third and to two thirds of the average emigration rate. Note that the "high-skill"
and "low-skill" emigration rates are highly correlated with the average emigration
rate (the correlation rates vary between 0.86 and 0.98 across samples for the high-
skill rate and between 0.87 and 0.99 for the low-skill rate). The results are presented
in Colums 2 and 3 of Table 5. The coe¢ cients on the skill-specic emigration rates
are signicant and higher in magnitude than in Column 1. However, these changes
in magnitudes are fully due to scale e¤ects, that is, they are inversely proportional
to the scale of the emigration rate included in the regression considered. Indeed, the
estimated coe¢ cient is multiplied by 3 when we use the emigration rate of college
graduates (one third of the average rate) and by 1.5 when we use the emigration rate
of the less educated (two thirds of the average rate).
Second, we interact the total emigration rate with the proportion of highly-
educated individuals among emigrants. As can be seen from Column 4 of Table
5, the coe¢ cient on this interaction term, SHMt 1, is not signicant.
19We only provide results for the Freedom House Political Rights Index (PR). Similar results
(available upon request) were obtained for the other indicators.
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Table 5. Dynamic regressions results with skill-specic emigration rates
Dependent = Freedom House Political Rights index (PR)
Full sample: Alternative Specications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total emig. ratet 1 .3162*** .3429*** .8027***
(.0710) (.0763) (.2636)
High-skilled emig. ratet 1 .8583***
(.2105)
Low-skilled emig. ratet 1 .4549***
(.1105)
SHMt 1 .0931
(.1225)
Total emig. rate*PRt 1 -.6265**
(.3188)
AR(1) test 6.3e-11 7.2e-11 5.4e-11 1.2e-10 1.9e-10
AR(2) test .7298 .7172 .7370 .7443 .7359
Hansen J test (p-v) .1856 .2208 .1365 .4027 .2935
Observations 765 765 765 765 765
N. countries 139 139 139 139 139
N. instr. 40 40 40 57 57
Notes:  p<0.01;  p<0.05 and  p<0.1. Robust standard errors clustered by country in
parentheses. One-step SYS-GMM estimator. AR(1) and AR(2): p-values of Arellano-Bond test
for serial correlations. Hansen J test: p-values for the null hypothesis of instrument validity. All
variables are instrumented using their own 1st to 3rd lags. In addition, SYS-GMM uses 1st di¤er-
ences lagged one period as instruments for the level equations. All specications include the lagged
dependent variable (not reported).
Finally, we also consider sub-samples excluding the countries with the highest
shares of high/low educated emigrants. Unreported results show that the e¤ect of
emigration increases when we drop the quartile of countries with the highest shares
of college graduates among emigrants, and conversely if we drop the quartile of coun-
tries with the lowest shares. However, we cannot infer from these results that less
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educated emigrants are more e¤ective at improving institutions. Indeed, eliminating
the top and bottom quartiles based on a di¤erent criterion (GDP per capita, or level
of democracy) gives similar results: the e¤et of emigration is greater in poor countries
with initially bad institutional quality. Rather, we conclude that the e¤ect of emigra-
tion is non linear, a result conrmed in Column 5 of Table 5 where we introduce an
interaction term between emigration and the lagged dependent variable. Altogether,
the results do not support the existence of heterogeneous e¤ects across skill groups.
4 Conclusion
Emigration a¤ects institutions in developing countries in many ways. By providing
people with exit options and a safety-net through remittance income, emigration
can lower incentives to voice internally and, eventually, delay democratic reform and
political change; on the other hand, emigrants can voice from abroad and support
diverse political groups and views at home; they can also contribute to the di¤usion
of democratic values and norms, be it directly, through return migration and contacts
with relatives, or indirectly, through social networks connecting diasporas and home-
country populations. Finally, since migration is a non-random process, emigration
alters the composition of the home-country population on several dimensions (notably
education and ethnicity) that can in turn a¤ect democracy at home.
In this paper we empirically investigate the overall impact of emigration on insti-
tutions in a large sample of developing countries. We nd that openness to migration
(measured by the total emigration rate) contributes to improve institutional quality
(as measured by standard indicators of democracy and economic freedom) in the mi-
grantsorigin countries. This result is robust to a wide range of specications and
estimation methods as well as to the exclusion of certain groups of countries (e.g.,
former socialist countries). Remarkably, the cross-sectional estimates are fully in
line with the implied long-run relationship obtained from dynamic panel regressions.
Also, emigration turns out to be a stronger and more robust determinant of institu-
tions than human capital, at least when using standard measures of human capital
such as the Barro and Lee (2013) data. We therefore conclude that emigration to lib-
eral democracies played an important role in determining institutional and political
change in developing countries, mostly for the better.
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Appendix
A. Summary statistics. Table A1 gives the correlation rates between the four
institutional indicators used in the paper; correlation rates are computed using pooled
data. Table A2 presents summary statistics for selected variables of interest. Sum-
mary statistics are computed using observations used in at least one regression. Table
A3 lists the countries included in the sample.
Table A1. Correlation rates between institutional indicators
PR CL polity2 EFW
PR 1.000
CL .8853 1.000
polity2 .8444 .7852 1.000
EFW .4354 .4984 .4588 1.000
Table A2. Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
PR 568 .454 .326 .0000 1.000
CL 568 .460 .266 .0000 1.000
Polity2 546 .569 .325 .0000 1.000
EFW 434 .576 .115 .1780 .7930
Human capital 568 3.82 4.04 .0610 24.91
Total emigration rate 568 .037 .068 .0001 .4654
Log GDP per capita 556 7.83 .983 5.016 9.743
Trade (as % of GDP) 525 7.29 4.15 .1080 35.87
Net ODA (as % of GNI) 488 .007 .010 -.0001 .0672
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B. Pseudo-gravity model. Table A4 describes the results of the pseudo-gravity
model used to predict bilateral migration stocks. Column 1 gives the results of the
cross-section regression based on the year 2005. Column 2 gives the results of the
panel estimation, in which time-dummies and interactions between time-dummies
and distance are included. The panel specication follows Feyrer (2009). Interactions
between time dummies and distance account for common shocks in transportation
technology (e.g. improvements in aircraft technology have induced more people to
move and have reduced long-distance migration costs). As long as changes in trans-
portation technologies are common to all countries, these time series changes will be
exogenous with respect to any particular country, but they will have di¤erent e¤ects
across country pairs, depending on the relative geographic position.
Table A4 shows that geographic characteristics are strong determinants of bilateral
migration stocks.20 As proxies of migration costs, linguistic links favor migration while
geographical distances are negatively correlated to bilateral migration stocks. Past
guest-worker programs have a positive e¤ect on bilateral migration stocks, as does
the population size at origin (bigger countries simply have more migrants in absolute
terms).
20On the full sample, the simple correlation between the predicted total emigration rate and the
observed emigration rate is 0.66, whereas regressing the predicted emigration rate on the actual
emigration rate and a constant term yields a (robust) standard error of .073 (coe¢ cient .55) and a
R-squared of 0.43.
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Table A4. Determinants of bilateral migration stocks (PPML estimation)
(1) (2)
Period 2005 1980-2010
Lingij 1.190 1.050
(.1478) (.1685)
lnDij -.7606
(.0740)
lnDij  I(1980) -1.047
(.1788)
lnDij  I(1985) -.9772
(.1755)
lnDij  I(1990) -.8073
(.0835)
lnDij  I(1995) -.8162
(.0799)
lnDij  I(2000) -.8203
(.0770)
lnDij  I(2005) -.7919
(.0798)
Guestij 1.639 1.482
(.1564) (.1801)
lnPi;t .5300 .5186
(0.269) (.0283)
Constant 7.701 8.5200
(.7644) (.8342)
Destination dummies yes yes
Year dummies no yes
N 3,820 22,920
Signicant at the level of 10 percent, 5 percent, 1 percent. The sample includes 20
destination countries and 191 developed and developing countries of origin. Robust standard errors
clustered by country pair in parentheses.
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